Mariamercedes Power v. Riverview Financial Corporation : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Mariamercedes Power v. Riverview Financial
Corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell C. Fericks; Gerald J. Lallatin; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellant.
Randall N. Skanchy; Deno G. Himonas; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mariamercedes Power v. Riverview Financial Corporation, No. 930535 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5453
UishC 
MAY 2 7 1994 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 930535CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
RUSSELL C. FERICKS 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
DENO G. HIMONAS 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
UTAH CO , ?^ ^ F APPEALS 
in T I IK n n i r " " , i r ' A n n i ?ATiS 
STATE 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 930535CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
RUSSELL C. FERICKS 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
DENO G. HIMONAS 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake Cii-v. Utah 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT'S RULE 60(b)(7) CHANGE 
PRIOR RULINGS NOT GOVERNED BY RULE 54(b) 
STANDARD 
POINT II 
NUMEROUS QUESTIONS OF FACT 
REMAIN FOR JURY TRIAL 6 
CONCLUSION 9 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 
777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989) 6 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 
739 P.2d 634# 637 (Utah App. 1987) 5 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 
818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) 8, 10, 11 
Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n. , 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982) 3 
Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern 
Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah 1992) 3 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 
761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988) 1# 2, 5 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 
844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) 6 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) 3, 4, 5 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1992) 8 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(7) . . . 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURTS RULE 60(b)(7) 
CHANGE OP PRIOR RULINGS NOT GOVERNED 
BY RULE 54(b) STANDARD 
Defendant argues that it makes no difference whether 
Judge Young considered the Motion for Relief from Order Denying 
Summary Judgment under Rule 60(b)(7), U. R. Civ. P., as 
originally filed, or under Rule 54(b), U. R. Civ. P. as now 
argued. To the contrary, the two rules set different standards. 
See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 
42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988). 
Rule 54(b) means "[a]ny judge is free to change his or 
her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally 
rendered . . . ." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 
761 P.2d at 45. However, Rule 60(b)(7) implicates "the xlaw of 
the case' doctrine [which] is employed to avoid delay and to 
prevent injustice" such as expense and delay resulting from 
repetitive consideration of the same issues in a single case. 
Id. "Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior rulings in 
complex cases as subsequent developments in the case might 
suggest . . . . The *law of the case doctrine' nonetheless . . . 
create[s] a kind of presumption that the court's prior rulings, 
even if not certified as final under Rule 54(b), were correct and 
should stand." Id., pp. 44-45, n. 5. 
Judge Wilkinson denied summary judgment on the implied-
in-fact contract issue. Defendant asked Judge Wilkinson to 
change his mind in its first motion to reconsider in 1991. He 
didn't. Defendant addressed the same issue in 1992 when it asked 
Judge Noel to rule, in limine, that plaintiff's evidence of 
implied-in-fact contract terms of employment was not relevant or 
admissible. Judge Noel ruled that the evidence of the implied-
in-fact contract was substantial, and he scheduled the case for 
trial on the basis of that evidence. 
Defendant sought a fourth bite at the apple in 1993 
when it asked Judge Young to reconsider Judge Wilkinson's denial 
of summary judgment on the implied-in-fact contract issue. The 
Motion to Reconsider (styled as "Defendant's Motion for Relief 
from Order", R. at 657-59) offered no new evidence. It suggested 
no "subsequent developments in the case" to justify a different 
result. This directly violated the law of case doctrine. "The 
law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the 
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present 
the case in a different light, such as when no new material 
evidence is introduced." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d at 45. 
Defendant argues that whether Judge Young applied the 
standard of Rule 54(b) or Rule 60(b)(7), the result would have 
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been the same. That is not correct. Where the judge who made 
the initial determination is not available to "change his mind" 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), defendant's motion should have been 
either denied outright or else held to the very high standards of 
Rule 60(b)(7). That requires "extraordinary" circumstances. 
Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 
1982), Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 
838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah 1992). Defendant didn't even attempt to 
meet the higher standard of Rule 60(b)(7). 
Defendant relies on Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 
(Utah 1993) to support its argument on this issue. It is 
inapposite. Timm v. Dewsnup involved a suit filed in September 
1980 by lenders on a real estate transaction against their 
borrower. Lender obtained summary judgment on its claim in March 
1981. Defendant's counsel did not appear to oppose summary 
judgment; and, importantly, the judgment did not address the 
defendant/borrower's counterclaim to reform the written 
instruments which the plaintiff/lender had sued to enforce. The 
defendant filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 1981. The 
bankruptcy was converted to Chapter 7 for liquidation in June 
1984. It was not until January 1991 that the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy trustee abandoned defendant's counterclaim as an asset 
of the bankruptcy estate. Defendant immediately asked the state 
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trial court for permission to amend her counterclaim and moved 
for reconsideration of summary judgment under Rule 54(b), U. R. 
Civ. P. The trial court refused, and ruled that "it had 
* implicitly' denied the counterclaim when it granted summary 
judgment in 1981, and that the summary judgment was *a final 
appealable judgment' at that time." 851 P.2d at 1180. The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
In Timm v. Dewsnup, the Supreme Court preserved a 
litigant's right to resolution of her case on the merits, where 
there was extended delay and where the original circumstances of 
the transaction were extremely suspect. In that case, the same 
trial judge was available to "change his mind" when his prior 
decisions left the case in a procedural limbo. (I.e., summary 
judgment granted on plaintiff's claim, with no affirmative 
disposition of defendant's counterclaim.) Under the 
circumstances, it was error for the trial court to not change its 
mind. 
In the present case, there is no significant period of 
delay, no intervening change of circumstances, and no procedural 
limbo created by the prior decision of trial judges Wilkinson and 
Noel. In addition, neither of those judges were available to 
consider defendant's motion as a Rule 54(b) opportunity to change 
their minds on the basis of "new material facts" as required by 
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Salt Lake Citv Corp, v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah 
App. 1988). Finally, the effect of reconsideration in this case 
is devastating to plaintiff. Judge Young eliminated, rather than 
preserved Ms. Power's rights and interests. Defendant would like 
this Court to read Timm v. Dewsnup as requiring reconsideration 
any time a motion reasonably analogous to Rule 54(b) is made. It 
doesn't. 
Defendant finally argues that application of the lower 
threshold of Rule 54(b) was harmless error. Accepting this 
argument would require this Court to assume that Power could 
never prevail in front of a reasonable jury. Two of three trial 
judges who reviewed the evidence disagree. Such an assumption is 
contrary to the presumption favoring the non-moving party (here, 
the plaintiff) in review of summary judgment. Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991); Conder v. A.L. 
Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah App. 1987). 
An appellate court does not weigh the facts and sustain or 
reverse summary judgment based on probabilities of success at 
trial. The issue for appellate review is whether plaintiff had 
evidence to prove material issues of fact, not whether defendant 
had more or better evidence. Judge Young's conclusion that "all 
[of defendant's] assurances remained consistent with the 
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[plaintiff's] *at will' status" simply ignores substantial record 
evidence to the contrary. 
Judge Young's error in not requiring defendant to meet 
the high standard of Rule 60(b) was extremely harmful. It 
required Power to take a costly and time-consuming appellate 
detour enroute to realization of her constitutional right to jury 
trial. The summary judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial on the merits, as originally decided. 
POINT II 
NUMEROUS QUESTIONS OF FACT 
REMAIN FOR JURY TRIAL 
In its response, defendant has summarized its best 
evidence to refute an implied-in-fact employment contract. There 
is nothing new here. What is important is that defendant does 
not contest the plaintiff's substantial evidence which rebuts the 
at-will presumption. A clearer question of fact for the jury is 
hard to imagine. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized the jury as the appropriate arbiter of such disputes. 
Caldwell v. Ford. Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1989); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 
(Utah 1991); and Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303, 
306 (Utah 1992). 
Defendant wants to draw this Court into an 
inappropriate fact-finding function, focusing solely on 
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defendant's evidence and ignoring plaintiff's support. The Court 
should not be seduced into this role. The law of at-will and 
implied-in-fact contracts in Utah has been stated repeatedly and 
clearly. It is time for juries to decide the cases, guided by 
the published legal standards: 
Let the jury decide whether defendant 
*repeatedly and in the simplest of terms' 
reserved the at-will presumption, as defense 
counsel claims. 
Let the jury decide if defendant's 
reservation of at-will (i.e., "although we 
generally will follow a disciplinary process 
because we are at-will, The Company reserves 
the right to terminate a team member 
immediately") is "unequivocal" and "clear." 
Let the jury decide if an at-will reservation 
buried 272 pages inside a 304 page manual is 
"clear and conspicuous", as required by 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d at 999 
and 1003, in the face of numerous earlier 
calls for team spirit, promises of 
advancement through initiative, and personal 
pledges of fair treatment and rational 
procedures from the defendant's owners. 
Let the jury decide if express promises of 
specific discipline standards and procedures, 
made both in person and in a color video 
presentation published company-wide, manifest 
an intent of the parties for something other 
than at-will. (Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. 
818 P.2d at 1001). 
Let the jury decide if defendant's frequent, 
specific expressions of loyalty and concern 
for employees created an "atmosphere" in 
which employees reasonably expected something 
other than at-will as a standard by which 
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they would be treated. Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992). 
Let the jury decide if the 1 hour and 15 
minute video presentation of defendant's 
President and Chairman of the Board, with its 
numerous factual scenarios stating explicitly 
what was fair in the way of employee 
treatment, was "sufficiently definite to 
operate as a contract provision." Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d at 1002. 
Let the jury decide what it means when 
defendant qualified its employee handbook 
with the introductory statement: "we do not 
expect this handbook to answer all of your 
questions. Your supervisor will be your 
major source of information." And then 
plaintiff's supervisors and superiors 
represented that termination would only occur 
for cause and after following disciplinary 
processes. 
Let the jury decide what was objectively 
intended and understood when defendant's 
Chairman of the Board represented in living 
color that "the values of the company are 
without question the most important thing . . 
. . One of the things you are going to find 
in terms of the values here, is that they're 
absolutes. . . . The success of Mrs. Fields 
has really been a function of the values of 
the company. . . . This is like coming home, 
this is like building a relationship [which 
you need to understand] early on in your 
career with Mrs. Fields Your 
career path with Mrs. Fields . . . more than 
anything else depends on your commitment to 
this value system. . . . The values of the 
company that we are going to elaborate this 
morning have not changed from the day that 
[Debbie Fields] opened the store in August of 
1977. . . . What has changed are almost 
every procedure in the company." And those 
comments were followed up by defendant's 
President, Debbie Fields, who said 
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"commitment to our people: that's number one. 
. . . Everything that you do is absolutely 
grounded to these values that you will soon 
learn about. . . . And I'm real clear. . . 
. you also need to know that you can hold me 
100% accountable . . . .' 
Defendant's citation to cases from other states and 
even federal courts should not cloud the issue. Utah's courts 
have consistently held that issues of intent, objective 
understandings, and the sufficiency of representations to 
constitute contractual terms are questions of fact which should 
not be lightly withdrawn from the jury. The trial court's foray 
into fact finding should be corrected by a reversal and remand 
for trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal can easily be decided on the "law of the 
case" doctrine. Judge Young impermissibly substituted his 
judgment in place of two prior refusals to dismiss by Judge 
Wilkinson and a consistent factual review by Judge Noel through 
Motion in Limine. In essence, he sat in appellate review of his 
peers. No new facts were offered by the defendant to support 
reconsideration. The new case law offered by defendant in 
support of the motion did not change the applicable legal 
principles. 
The appeal can also be decided on the more fundamental 
level of summary judgment standards. Substantial evidence 
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supports the plaintiffs claim of an implied-in-fact employment 
contract which is terminable only for cause after specific 
standards of fairness and procedures for discipline are observed. 
Defendant doesn't contest the existence of that information. 
Rather, it hangs it hat on inclusion of the term "at-will" in the 
initial application form which was given to plaintiff as an 
administrative afterthought after plaintiff had started work, 
which was buried deep in a Policies and Procedures Manual, and 
which was expressed equivocally in an Employee Handbook. 
Defendant does not contest that written terms can be overridden 
by verbal representations, by conduct of parties, or by 
subsequent modifications. 
The only way for this Court to sustain summary judgment 
under these circumstances is to rule, as a matter of law, that 
whenever the term "at-will" shows up in employee documents, it 
always trumps contrary representations, other terms of 
employment, and inconsistent courses of dealing. Contrary to 
defendant's claim (p. 10 of defendant's brief), that is not the 
holding of Johnson v. Morton Thiokolf 818 P.2d 997, 1003-4 (Utah 
1991), or of any other opinion in Utah. Such a result would be a 
step backward into a darker employment era. It would encourage 
employers to pander for employee loyalty and enhanced performance 
with no risk that their words would ever be taken seriously or 
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that they would be held accountable for the normal consequences 
which strong expressions of obligation create in all other areas 
of commercial endeavor. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997, 
1005 (Utah 1991) Stewart, J. concurring. 
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